From owner-mcg-talk@localhost Fri May 9 04:45:27 1997 Return-Path: owner-mcg-talk@novaware.cps.softex.br Received: (from majordom@localhost) by localhost (8.8.5/v3.2) id EAA06996 for mcg-talk-outgoing; Fri, 9 May 1997 04:45:27 -0300 Message-Id: <199705090745.EAA06996@localhost> Date: Fri, 09 May 1997 08:49:29 +0100 To: "173447" From: "268791" Subject: Re: TTP/CA roles in MC design Sender: owner-mcg-talk@novaware.cps.softex.br Status: RO X-Status: At 20:38 8/05/97 -0700, you wrote: >I do not understand given the ppt presentation how the MC design avoids >the conditions which motivate GAK, or a govt desire to have access to >private keys.. [snip] >Surely, a govt may require any such CA to be licensed, in order to serve >in this reliable role, just as with the other third-party schemes; >having instituted licensing, the temptation to use that control point to >then require the providers to enforce private key escrow will be as >strong for the MC design, as for any other scheme. Technology will not diminish the desire of governments to have access to private communications. It may weaken the justification for the arguments they use to support their claims. In the UK the Government presents the benefits of licensing CAs to ensure they can be relied on as the counterpart to its having access to private keys. If I understand the MC correctly, the client needs much less reliance on a single CA's authentication process. The client can compare several independent sources, with a powerful effect on the aggregate reliability even of individually risky sources. So if the client can check in a telephone directory, a street directory and a trade directory as well as a perhaps doubtful CA, the overall reliability is quite high (takes time and a lot of trouble to spoof them all). This undermines the strength of the Government claim to be conferring a vital benefit by licensing CAs. BTW, and off this topic, yesterday there was a power failure at Telehouse said to affect the telecommunications of 90% of UK ISPs plus numerous financial and other institutions. The building is ultra-secure against attack, and has two independent external power sources, diesel generators and a battery room. What went wrong? An employee threw the wrong switch by mistake. What might go wrong at a TTP holding private keys? Regards, Nicholas Bohm ------------------------------------------------------------------------ Salkyns, Great Canfield, Takeley, Bishop's Stortford CM22 6SX, UK Phone 01279 870285 (Internationally +44 1279 870285) Fax 01279 870215 (Internationally +44 1279 870215) Mobile 0860 636749 (Internationally +44 860 636749)